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Automobile guest statutes have been enacted to change the common
law in more than half the states.' The gratuitous guest is limited in
recovery to situations where the host is more than ordinarily negligent-that is, the host has committed some form of aggravated
misconduct. New Mexico has adopted such a statute. 2 This Comment is concerned solely with the liability of a non-operating owner
for his act of negligent entrustment of his automobile and the protection afforded to the non-operating owner under the guest statute;
the Comment is not concerned with the vicarious liability of the
non-operating owner for the conduct of the person driving the
automobile. Will ordinary negligence of the non-operating owner in
entrusting a defective automobile make him liable to the operator's
guest who is killed or injured in an accident resulting from this defective condition? Or must the conduct of the non-operating owner
in entrusting the defective automobile amount to the "heedlessness
or reckless disregard of the rights of the others" specified in the
New Mexico guest statute3 to make him liable to a guest who is
killed or injured?
In Lewis v. Knott,4 the administrator of the estate of his daughter filed a complaint against two defendants-the non-operating
owner and the operator of an automobile-for damages for the
death of his daughter. The plaintiff's daughter was killed in an
automobile accident in which one defendant had been driving. The
owner was the operator's father.' The accident occurred when the
left front tire blew out and caused the automobile to skid and over*Lewis v. Knott, 405 P.2d 662 (N.M. 1965).
1. Prosser, Torts § 33, at 190 (3d ed. 1964).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-1 (Repl. 1960), entitled "An Act Releasing Owners of
Motor Vehicles From Responsibility for Injuries to Passengers Therein," provides:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action
for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case
of accident unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said
owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of
the rights of others.
For a discussion of other questions raised under the New Mexico guest statute, see
Comments, 3 Natural Resources J. 170 (1963) ; 4 id. 168 (1964).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-1 (Repl. 1960).
4. 405 P.2d 662 (N.M. 1965).
5. In Lewis, the operator was the son of the owner of the automobile. The owner
permitted his son to use the automobile for his pleasure. New Mexico has adopted the
"family purpose doctrine." E.g., Burkhart v. Corn, 59 N.M. 343, 284 P.2d 226 (1955).
However, the application of this doctrine was not raised in Lewis.
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turn. Testimony during the trial tended to show that both defendants, the owner and the operator, knew that the left front tire was
smooth.6
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the trial court sustained
the defendant's motion for directed verdict against the plaintiff.
Judgment was entered upon the verdict and the plaintiff appealed.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Judgment for the owner
affirmed; judgment for the operator reversed.7
The supreme court was divided in its reasoning for affirming
judgment in favor of the non-operating owner. Justice Compton,
in delivering the opinion of the court, affirmed on the strength of
the 1964 New Mexico case of Gallegos v. Wallace.8 Justice Compton held that the court's opinion in Gallegos supported this rule:
"Where the owner is not the operator no cause of action exists
against him for the negligence of the operator." '9 Justice Moise,
joined by Chief Justice Carmody, concurred specially in the result
of the opinion of Justice Compton, but did not concur with his
reasoning. 10 The concurring justices in Lewis reasoned that "ordinary rules of statutory construction require a conclusion that the
owner is covered . . . [under the guest statute] whether driving
or not, when suit is brought by a guest, whether his own or the
operator's." 1 The concurring justices found support for their con6. Record, pp. 80, 89, Lewis v. Knott, 405 P.2d 662 (N.M. 1965).
7. 405 P.2d at 664.
8. 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964). In Gallegos, a suit was brought by the personal representative of a guest who had been killed in an automobile accident. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. The granting of summary judgment was held to be incorrect because
there was inconsistent testimony in the record as to who was driving the automobile
at the time of the accident. The court said that if the automobile were being driven
by the owner, heedlessness and reckless disregard of the rights of others would be
necessary for liability. If the operator of the automobile were not the owner, only
ordinary negligence would have to be established.
9. Lewis v. Knott, 405 P.2d 662, 663 (N.M. 1965).
10. As a basis for disagreeing with the reasoning of Justice Compton, Justice
Moise said:
While I agree with the result reached in the opinion prepared by Justice
Compton, I do not agree that our recent case of Gallegos v. Wallace . . .
settles appellant's point 1, to the effect that the guest statute does not protect
an absent non-driver owner. As a matter of fact, an inference might be drawn
from what was said in Gallegos v. Wallace, supra, that only an owner driver
was entitled to the protection afforded by the statute.
Lewis v. Knott, 405 P.2d 662, 664-65 (N.M. 1965).
11. 405 P.2d at 665.
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clusion by reference12to the legislative intent expressed in the title
of the guest statute.
Similar cases from other jurisdictions have produced opposite
results from that reached by the New Mexico court in Lewis. In
8 a Kansas case, the defendant-father was held
Bisoni v. Carlson,"
liable for the injuries to the operator's guest caused by the negligence of his minor son. A Kansas statute 14 imposed liability on the
owner of a vehicle for damages caused by the negligent driving
of an operator under sixteen. The entrustment of a vehicle to an
incompetent driver is certainly analogous to the entrustment of a
defective vehicle, the situation suggested by Lewis. The Kansas
guest statute is practically identical with the New Mexico statute. 5
The Kansas court said that the only "owner" referred to in the
guest statute must be the "one who is transporting a person who
claims damages."' 6 Although the father was the owner, the court
held that the father was not protected under the guest statute because he was not the operator.
In Benton v. Sloss, 7 the court ruled on the application of the
California guest statute' 8 to the non-operating owner. The court
imposed liability on the non-operating owner for his negligence in
entrusting a car with defective brakes that caused an accident resulting in injuries to the operator's guest. Commenting on the
Benton case, the California court later said that Benton "holds
12.

We are impressed that it was intended by the legislature that owners should
be relieved of liability to guests in a motor vehicle unless the accident resulted from intentional conduct, or heedless or reckless disregard of the
rights of others ...
That this must have been the intention of the legislature is evident from
the broad title to the legislation ...
405 P.2d at 665. For the title to the New Mexico guest statute, see note 2 supra.
13.

171 Kan. 631, 237 P.2d 404 (1951).

14. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-222 (1949).
15. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-122b (1949):
No person who is transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle,
as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of
action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or
damage, unless such injury, death or damage shall have resulted from the
gross and wanton negligence of the operator of such motor vehicle.
16. Bisoni v. Carlson, 171 Kan. 631, 237 P.2d 404, 407 (1951).
(Emphasis the
court's.) Accord, Ware v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 181 Kan. 291, 311 P.2d 316

(1957) ; Greenwood v. Gardner, 189 Kan. 68, 366 P.2d 780 (1961).

See generally

Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 323 (1963).
17. 38 Cal. App. 2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952).

18. Cal. Vehicle Code § 17158 protects the "driver of the vehicle" and "any other
person legally responsible for the conduct of the driver" except in cases of "intoxication
or wilful misconduct of the driver."
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that the guest statute immunizes the person legally liable for the
conduct of such driver from a vicarious liability to the guest but
not from direct responsibility for his own negligence."' 9 Even
though the owner is not liable for the ordinary negligence of the
operator under the guest statute in California, the owner is liable
for his own acts of negligent entrustment.
The Alabama Supreme Court has construed the Alabama guest
statute,2 ° which is similar to the New Mexico statute, in a manner
completely at variance with the construction given by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Lewis. In Penton v. Favors,2 ' the Alabama
court held the owner of a vehicle with defective brakes or steering
liable for injuries caused to the operator's guest. The court in
Penton used the following reasoning:
[W]e do not think our statute was intended to limit the duty of the
owner who entrusts to an incompetent driver an automobile or to a
competent driver a defective automobile. . . . It is true that our
guest statute applies to the 'owner, operator or person responsible for
the operation of a motor vehicle.' We think that means to apply to
such person as may be responsible for the manner of its operation;
that it does not apply to the owner unless he is operating the car in
person or it is under his immediate control or is operated by his
19. Nault v. Smith, 194 Cal. App. 2d 257, 14 Cal. Rptr. 889, 896 (1961). (Emphasis
added.) Nault was concerned with the entrustment of an automobile to an incompetent driver. The court held that the owner was not protected by the guest statute,
justifying its decision upon the following policy considerations:
'The common law right of having redress for injuries inflicted, being lessened
by such [guest] statutes, necessitates strict construction and also that cases

be not held within the provisions of such statutes unless it clearly appears that
it should be so determined.' [Citations omitted.] In a day of increasing danger
from automobile accidents ...
we see no 'considerations of policy' for reducing liability for fault. To broaden the absolution here in order to cover the
• . [non-operating owner] would be to grant the statute a liberal construction, which violates the court's admonition, and to introduce new considerations of policy which trespass the exclusive province of the Legislature. [Emphasis the court's.]
14 Cal. Rptr. at 897. In Jones v. Ayers, 212 Cal. App. 2d 646, 28 Cal. Rptr. 223, 226
(1963), the court said: "Section 403 [former citation of guest statute, now Cal. Vehicle
Code § 17158] does not limit the common-law liability of the owner of a vehicle for
his own negligence as owner."
20. Ala. Code tit. 36, § 95 (1959):
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a motor
vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or
death of a guest while being transported without payment therefore in or upon
said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries
or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator,
owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.
21. 262 Ala. 262, 78 So. 2d 278 (1955).
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servant or agent duly authorized by him. When it is not being so
operated the liability of the owner is governed by common law
22

principles.

These cases from Alabama, California, and Kansas illustrate
that not all courts that have considered similar questions agree with
Justice Moise when he says that "ordinary rules of statutory construction require a conclusion" like the one reached by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Lewis.2 3 A number of courts have, however, construed their guest statutes in a manner similar to the construction given by the New Mexico court in Lewis.24
Lewis v. Knott must be considered in conjunction with the New
Mexico case of Gallegos v. Wallace,25 decided in 1964. Gallegos
held only that a non-owner operator is not protected by the guest
statute. Gallegos did not hold, as stated by Justice Compton in
Lewis, that "where the owner is not the operator no cause of action
exists against him for the negligence of the operator. ' 2 Justice
Moise, joined by Chief Justice Carmody, concurring specially, disagreed with Justice Compton on this very point:
While I agree with the result reached in the opinion prepared by
Justice Compton, I do not agree that our recent case of Gallegos v.
Wallace . . . settles appellant's point . . . to the effect that the
guest statute does not protect an absent non-driver owner. As a matter
of fact, an inference might be drawn from what was said in Gallegos
v. Wallace . . . that only an27owner driver was entitled to the protection afforded by the statute.

Gallegos stated that the New Mexico guest statute "affected
only the owner of a vehicle and that its scope was restricted to such
owners." 2 1 If the "owner" is the only person protected under the
guest statute, "operator" must be deleted. Thus, according to Gallegos, the guest statute should now be considered to read as follows:
No person transported by the owner . . . of a motor vehicle as his
22.
23.
24.
Paglia,
(1963).
25.
26.
27.
28.

78 So. 2d at 284. (Emphasis the court's.)
405 P.2d at 665.
E.g., Dryeson v. Hughes, 333 I1. App. 198, 76 N.E.2d 809 (1947); Tonti v.
171 Ohio St. 520, 172 N.E.2d 618 (1961). See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 324
74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964).
405 P.2d at 663.
Id. at 665.
74 N.M. at 764, 398 P.2d at 985.
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guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of
action for damages against such owner . . . for injury, death, or
loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner . . . or caused by his heedlessness
28
or reckless disregard of the rights of others.

The only words which have been omitted in the statutory excerpt are "or operator," a deletion required by the holding of
Gallegos. The words "his guest" in the statute must therefore apply
to the owner's guest; the act of "transporting" can now only refer
to the act of the owner. In Lewis, the decedent was the guest of the
operator, not the guest of the owner. Thus, according to Gallegos,
the guest statute in Lewis should not have been held to afford
refuge and non-liability to the non-operating owner.
The New Mexico court has frequently said that it will consider
the title of an act only when the language in the body of the statute
is ambiguous.3 0 Even by resorting to the title of the guest statute,8 '
the non-operating owner in Lewis should not be protected because
the decedent was not his guest. The language of section 64-24-1 is
not ambiguous, even after the decision in Gallegos. The title of
the guest statute, therefore, should not affect the contention that
the non-operating owner in Lewis should not have been protected
by the guest statute.
Intentional misconduct or heedlessness or reckless disregard of
the rights of others should not have been the standard for judging
the conduct of the non-operating owner in Lewis. Ordinary negligence is the correct test when the guest statute is inapplicable. Might
the defendant non-operating owner in Lewis be charged with ordinary negligence because he knowingly entrusted a car with a defective tire to his son ?
An owner who loans his vehicle is generally held liable for injuries sustained by a third person as the result of the defective
29. The actual statutory language is set forth in note 2 supra.
30. E.g., Hewatt v. Clark, 44 N.M. 453, 103 P.2d 646 (1940):
We understand that resort may be had to the title of an act to determine the
meaning of ambiguous language in the body of the act. But first the language
must be ambiguous and not clear. [Citations omitted.] We know the meaning
of this act must primarily be determined from the language of the act itself.
44 N.M. at 457, 103 P.2d at 649. See generally In re Cox's Estate, 57 N.M. 543, 260 P.2d
909 (1953) ; State ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n v. Old Abe Co., 43 N.M. 367, 94 P.2d
105 (1939).
31. "An Act Releasing Owners of Motor Vehicles From Responsibility for Injuries to Passengers Therein." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-1 (Repl. 1960).
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condition of the automobile.3 2 This rule is applicable when the owner
knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known,
that the vehicle was in a defective condition. 3 This is the rule in
New Mexico. 4 Although Lewis is a case of first impression for liability because of negligent entrustment under the guest statute, the
common law principle has been established for many years.
In Bradley v. Johnson,3 5 the plaintiff was injured when his vehicle
was struck by a trailer which had come loose from an automobile.
The trailer was not owned by the operator of the automobile, but
had been borrowed from the co-defendant. The jury found that
the accident was caused by a defective weld on the trailer, causing
it to separate from the automobile. The New Mexico Supreme
Court approved this instruction given by the trial court to the jury:
If you find that the two-wheeled trailer involved in this accident
was, prior to this accident, in a condition unfit for use on the public
highways; and ...if you find, further, that the Defendant ...
owned the trailer, and furnished it to others, knowing that it was to
be used on the public highways; and when he knew or by the exercise
of reasonable care, should have known of its defective condition, and
when he knew it to be unlikely that the defective condition would be
repaired3 6 before use; then Defendant . . .is guilty of negligence
herein.

A later New Mexico case, Ferran v. Jacquez,87 reaffirmed the
common law duty of not knowingly loaning a defective vehicle.
The plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by defective brakes.
The New Mexico statute3 in question in Ferran prescribed certain standards for brake conditions. The supreme court, reversing
a directed verdict for the non-operating owner, said that the condition of the brakes was a question for the jury. "If the brakes
do not meet the standard set by the statute, and such failure is not
excused, the owner is guilty of negligence
in permitting the auto' 89
mobile on the highway in such condition.
32. See generally Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 161 (1952)

(tire failures) ; Annot., 46

A.L.R.2d 404 (1956) (miscellaneous defects) ; 8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles O Highway
Trafc § 500 (1963).
33. See authorities cited in note 32 supra.
34. Ferran v. Jacquez, 68 N.M. 367, 362 P.2d 519 (1961) ; Bradley v. Johnson, 60
N.M. 453, 292 P.2d 325 (1955).
35. 60 N.M. 453, 292 P.2d 325 (1955).
36. Id. at 455, 292 P.2d at 326.
37. 68 N.M.367, 362 P.2d 519 (1961).
38. N.M.Stat. Ann.§ 64-20-41 (Supp.1965).
39. Ferran v.Jacquez, 68 N.M.367, 371, 362 P.2d 519, 521 (1961).
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The duty of an owner not to loan a defective automobile with
knowledge of the defect has been approved in most states,4 ° though
none of these cases were decided under a guest statute. According
to Gallegos, the New Mexico guest statute has no application in
Lewis because the owner was not operating the automobile. In
Lewis, it was averred that the owner loaned his car to the co-defendant operator knowing that the tires were defective. 4 - The accident
and death of the plaintiff's intestate allegedly resulted from the
defective tire. 42 It is submitted, therefore, that the New Mexico
Supreme Court erred in affirming the directed verdict for the nonoperating owner in Lewis because the court misapplied the holding
in Gallegos.
What is the significance of the decision in Lewis v. Knott? The
case should not be used as precedent because the majority of the
court did not concur in the reasoning of the court's opinion. 43 The
opinion of Justice Compton, when compared to the specially concurring opinion of Justice Moise, indicates that the court is not yet
certain of the full import of Gallegos v. Wallace.44 It is clear on
reading Gallegos that the operator, if he is not the owner, is not
protected by the guest statute, and all reference to the operator
should be deleted from the guest statute in accordance with the
holding in Gallegos. The construction of the New Mexico guest
statute given by the supreme court in Gallegos apparently met with
the approval of the 1965 legislature because none of the bills introduced to change or repeal section 64-24-1 were passed. 45 This
could only mean that the legislature was content with the literal
interpretation of Gallegos: "[T]he legislation affected only the
owner of a vehicle and that its scope was restricted to such owners." 46 Even after the legislature failed to enact new legislation to
change the holding of Gallegos, the specially concurring opinion in
40. E.g., Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Mabry, 128 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1942);
Gregory v. Ross, 214- Ga. 306, 104 S.E.2d 452 (1958) ; Riggs v. Roberts, 74 Idaho 473,
264 P.2d 698 (1953) ; Adcock v. McDonald, 224 Miss. 122, 79 So. 2d 715 (1955) ; Gibbs
v. Gaimel, 257 N.C. 650, 127 S.E.2d 271 (1962) ; Delair v. McAdoo, 324 Pa. 392, 188
At. 181 (1936) ;Campbell v. Swinney, 328 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) ; Kowalke
v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 3 Wis. 2d 389, 88 N.W.2d 747 (1958). See generally 4
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice § 2333 (1946).
41. Record, pp. 80, 89, Lewis v. Knott, 405 P.2d 662 (N.M. 1965).
42. Ibid. However, it should be noted that there was conflicting testimony during
the trial as to this point.
43. See Comment, 5 Natural Resources J. 403 (1965).
44. 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964).
45. H.R. 294, 418; S.185, 327, N.M. 27th Leg., 1st Sess. (1965).
46. 74 N.M. at 764, 398 P.2d at 985. (Emphasis the court's.)
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Lewis supported its reasoning by reference to the intent of the
legislature in drafting the guest statute. This would appear to be
an attempt at judicial legislation, especially in view of the nonaction of the 1965 legislature, which met after the decision in Gallegos had been delivered in 1964.
The court should construe the guest statute strictly because it
is an abrogation of the common law.47 Because Gallegos held that
it was unconstitutional to apply the guest statute to operators, strict
construction of the remaining part of the guest statute suggests
that the result in Lewis with respect to the non-operating owner
was incorrect.
It is submitted that the result in Lewis is wrong insofar as it
places a non-operating owner under the protection of the guest
statute. Negligent entrustment by an owner which is ultimately
responsible for injuries or death to an operator's guest should be
governed by common law principles of ordinary negligence-not by
the concepts of aggravated misconduct described in the guest statute.
If the non-operating owner is to be protected from his own negligence, this decision must come from the legislature and not the
courts.
PETER J. BROULLIRE III

47. Prosser, Torts § 33, at 190 (3d ed. 1964).

